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We introduce a general framework in which politicians choose a (possibly infinite) sequence 
of binary policies. The two competing candidates are exogenously committed to particular 
actions on a subset of these issues, while they can choose any policy for the remaining issues 
to maximize their winning probability. Citizens have general preferences over policies, and 
the distribution of preferences may be uncertain. We show that a special case of the model, 
the weighted-issue model, provides a tractable multidimensional model of candidate 
competition that can generate (i) policy divergence in pure and mixed strategies, (ii) adoption 
of minority positions, and (iii) inefficient outcomes. 
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The one-dimensional policy model based on the seminal contributions of Hotelling (1929) and
Downs (1957) is the most widely used and successful model framework for a formal analysis of
political equilibria. Yet, there are some tensions within the model, and between the model and
some real-world observations.
First, in the one-dimensional spatial model, there is a strong tendency for candidates to converge
to the same, moderate position that appeals to the “median voter” (mitigated only if the candidates
care about policy and to the extent that the position of the median is uncertain); furthermore, all
voters (including those with extreme preferences) are, in equilibrium, indiﬀerent between the two
candidates, as they propose the same policy. Yet, in reality, candidates often run on considerably
divergent policy platforms, and voters often intensely favor one candidate over the other.
Second, while the model is formally one-dimensional and continuous, policy in reality is often
multidimensional (there are many policy issues) and binary (e.g., candidates are either for with-
drawing troops from Iraq or against it).1 In fact, a widespread casual interpretation of policy in
the one-dimensional model is based on multidimensional policies. For example, the statement that
“Hillary Clinton used her support for the Iraq war to move towards the political center,” implies
that her initial position (on other issues, say on health care) is left-of-center, but by adopting a
conservative position on a particular issue, she can move to the right on the policy line.
This informal multi-issue interpretation of the one-dimensional model is somewhat problematic
regarding the treatment of moderates. For example, suppose we accept the notion that support
for state-provided health-care is a liberal position and support for the Iraq war is a conservative
position, and suppose that these are the only two positions and that they are equally important.
Then both “Hillary” (with positions as described above) and a voter who opposes both state-
provided health care and the Iraq war would be considered “moderate” with a position in the
center in a one-dimensional model, suggesting that the voter is likely to support her. Yet, the
voter could plausibly prefer another candidate with a “more extreme” position, say, someone who
supports state-provided health care but opposes the Iraq war.
This paper develops a model that directly treats policy as multidimensional and binary. A
multidimensional policy vector describes a candidate’s position on a number of diﬀerent issues.2
Each candidate is exogenously ﬁxed on some issues. These ﬁxed positions can be interpreted as
characteristics of the candidate (such as party aﬃliation, incumbency, gender, race or experience in
previous elected oﬃce), or political issues on which a candidate has taken a stand in the past and
where a commitment to a diﬀerent position is not credible and/or not helpful. On the remaining
issues, candidates are free to choose any position. By combining ﬁxed and selectable positions, we
provide a middle ground between Downsian models, in which candidates are free to choose any
position, and the citizen candidate model, in which no commitment is possible.
The most important result for political competition in a Downsian framework is that oﬃce-
motivated candidates propose policies that appeal to the median voter. In our multi-dimensional
model, there is no geometric notion of a median, but our concept of majority-eﬃciency captures
the same fundamental idea of moderation. A policy is majority-eﬃcient if a majority of voters
prefers the proposed policy to any other policy that a candidate could choose. In some sense, a
majority-eﬃcient policy is the most popular policy a candidate can choose, subject to the constraints
1Even more nuanced positions are few in numbers and can usually be expressed by a small number of binary,
“yes” or “no” answers. More generally, any information that a candidate can provide to the electorate must be ﬁnite
and therefore representable in a binary format.
2Since positions on the real line (or, more generally, in R
n) can be encoded in binary form, this binary model
encompasses as special cases the standard Downsian model and the probabilistic voting model.
1imposed by his ﬁxed positions. The relevant question is whether candidates choose majority-eﬃcient
positions in equilibrium.
We focus on two classes of preferences. Using the ﬁrst type of “scoring” preferences, our model
eﬀectively generalizes the one-dimensional Downsian model to allow for constraints on the positions
that candidates can choose. The second type of preferences is not reducible to one dimension: A
citizen’s utility is a weighted sum of the distances between the candidate’s actual position and the
voter’s ideal position on each issue. This “weighted-issue model” provides a simple and tractable
framework to analyze multidimensional policies.
In the (generalized Downsian) scoring model, majority-eﬃcient policies exist, and there is al-
ways an equilibrium where both candidates propose such policies. Majority-eﬃcient policies also
exist in the weighted-issue model for many distributions of voter preferences, and we character-
ize suﬃcient (and generic) conditions for existence. However, the multidimensional nature of the
weighted-issue model fundamentally changes the eﬃciency properties of the model. In equilibrium,
a candidate may choose to propose majority-ineﬃcient policies, because adopting minority posi-
tions may increase his winning probability. Further, candidates’ policies may diverge in order to
attract diﬀerent types of constituents, a behavior which some political commentators may refer to
as “catering to the base” (see, for example, Edsall (2006)). In the Downsian model, neglecting
the median voter in order to choose policies that please extremists reduces a candidate’s winning
probability, so that platform divergence cannot be rationalized as an electoral success strategy in
that model.3 In contrast, it is easy to generate examples in the weighted-issue model, in which
candidates’ cater to minority views and where the policies diverge.
The fundamental reason for ineﬃciency results is the following: When choosing a stand on
an issue, candidates consider whether a particular position will win or lose more votes, i.e., they
care about swing voters. The Downsian model has the special property that a policy position that
wins votes from swing voters is also better for a majority of voters than any other position that a
candidate might take, but in a more general model, this is usually not true.
A related topic is the issue of divergence. While, in the Downsian model, candidates have a
strong incentive to approach their opponent’s position (possibly without quite reaching it), the
same is not necessarily true in the weighted issue model. There, it may also be the case that
both candidates strictly prefer to diﬀerentiate from each other in one issue, or that one prefers to
diﬀerentiate while the other one would like to mimic his opponent.
The result that majority-eﬃcient policies often exist in the weighted-issue model is signiﬁcant
in its own right: Plott (1967) has shown that Condorcet winners exist in a multidimensional Eu-
clidean setting only for a highly non-generic conﬁguration of preferences (in a setting without ﬁxed
positions, the concept of a Condorcet winner is equivalent to majority-eﬃciency). This problem
has severely limited the applicability of the Downsian model as a tool to study multidimensional
policy. For example, many papers that apply political economy arguments to particular ﬁelds es-
sentially analyze policy as if there were only one political issue in which the median voter’s opinion
is decisive. In contrast, in the binary weighted-issue model, if a majority-eﬃcient position exists
for a particular voter distribution, it generically also exists for a slightly perturbed distribution of
voters. In many cases, the weighted-issue model provides a tractable framework for the analysis of
multidimensional policies.
3There are certainly modiﬁcations of the Downsian framework in which divergence occurs in equilibrium. For
example, policy-motivated candidates (see Calvert (1985)) face a trade-oﬀ between proposing a policy that they like
and increasing their winning probability through moderation. Similarly, in the citizen-candidate model (see Osborne
and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997)), candidates enter at non-median positions. However, in each of these
models, converging towards the position of the opponent (if possible) would actually increase a candidate’s winning
probability.
2We also extend our model to analyze the eﬀects of uncertainty on the candidates’ policy choice.
Generalizing the concept of a valence (i.e., quality) diﬀerence between candidates, we characterize
conditions that guarantee that candidates choose majority-eﬃcient policies. We also analyze the
case of uncertainty about the distribution of voters’ policy preferences (rather than about valence).
Here, we introduce the concept of competition-eﬃciency. The equilibrium is competition-eﬃcient
if a social planner could not pick two alternative platforms (one for each candidate) and make
a majority of the electorate better oﬀ. When voters’ policy preferences are uncertain, the equi-
librium in the Downsian model is competition-ineﬃcient, because candidates converge too much.
Interestingly, in the weighted-issue model, both excessive convergence and excessive divergence in
equilibrium are possible.
We present the model in the next section. In Section 3, we introduce the concept of majority-
eﬃciency. Results for the model without uncertainty are in Section 4. Section 5 generalizes the
model to allow for valence and preference distribution uncertainty, deﬁnes competition-eﬃciency
and contains the results for this framework. We relate our model to previous literature in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
Two candidates, j = 0,1, compete in an election. Candidates are oﬃce-motivated and receive
utility 1, if elected, and utility 0, otherwise, independent of the implemented policy. Candidate j, if
elected, implements a policy described by aj = (a
j
i)i∈N, where each a
j
i ∈ {0,1} denotes Candidate j’s
position on issue i (0 can be interpreted as opposition to a particular proposal, and 1 as support
of that proposal).
Candidate j can freely choose a policy on a subset of issues Sj ⊂ N, while on the remaining
issues no commitment is possible. Thus, Candidate j’s type is given by a = (a
j
i)i/ ∈Sj, while his
platform is given by a = (a
j
i)i∈Sj. Candidate j’s policy consists of the combination of his type and
platform, so that his set of feasible policies is given by Aj = {(ai)i∈N|ai = ¯ a
j
i for all i / ∈ Sj and
ai ∈ {0,1} for i ∈ Sj}. Each citizen θ ∈ Θ has preferences uθ(a), where a = (ai)i∈N ∈ {0,1}N is
the implemented policy. Let µ be the distribution of citizens. Note that this is just a frequency
distribution which is known to the candidates.4
The timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1 Candidates j = 1,2 simultaneously announce policies aj ∈ Aj. A mixed strategy by
agent j consists of a probability distribution σj over Aj.
Stage 2 Each citizen votes for his preferred candidate, or abstains when he is indiﬀerent between









In case of a tie between the candidates, each wins with probability 0.5.
Clearly, mixed strategy equilibria always exist if each Sj is ﬁnite.
The assumption that politicians have only a binary choice may, at ﬁrst glance, seem restrictive,
but it is possible to combine several issues in our formal framework to deal with policy questions
where candidates can choose between more than just two possible positions. In fact, as mentioned
4In section 5 we generalize the model to allow for uncertainty about this distribution, and preference shocks.
5If a voter has a strict preference, then it is a weakly dominant strategy to vote for the preferred candidate. If an
agent is indiﬀerent, he could in principle vote for any candidate or abstain, but the assumption of abstention is quite
natural, and none of the results in this paper depends critically on it.
3in the introduction any issue that can be described in a ﬁnite language is obviously representable
in binary form.
2.2 Interpretation and Discussion: Fixed issues
A key feature of our model, made possible by the multidimensional structure, is that candidates can
commit to a policy on some issues, while they are ﬁxed to an exogenously given position in other
dimensions. Thus, our model combines the commitment assumption of the standard Downsian
model (with respect to Sj) with the assumption in citizen candidate models (Osborne and Slivinski
(1996), Besley and Coate (1997)) that no commitment to a policy other than the candidate’s ideal
point is possible. This appears to be a reasonable convex combination of these two central models
in the literature. In reality, candidates have commitment power on some issues. If a candidate
makes a promise a central campaign theme (say, not to raise taxes, to end a war), then breaking
that promise is at least very costly for the candidate, and, counterexamples not withstanding, most
candidates keep their central election promises.
However, there are other dimensions in which candidates cannot easily commit to diﬀerent po-
sitions. This is obviously true for characteristics of the candidate that matter for at least some
voters, like gender, race, religious aﬃliation, experience in previous elected oﬃce.6 These charac-
teristics can be interpreted as “ﬁxed positions”, at least in the short run, which is the focus of our
analysis.7 Other ﬁxed positions may correspond to political issues in which a candidate has taken
a stand in the past and where a commitment to a diﬀerent position is not credible and/or not
helpful. For example, a candidate who took a strong pro-choice stand in his past legislative voting
record may not be able to credibly commit to a pro-life platform, and therefore is essentially ﬁxed
to his previous position on the abortion issue.
One important committed issue is party aﬃliation. When a candidate runs as a Democrat
for the U.S. Congress and wins, he is committed to support his fellow Democrats in committee
appointments (i.e., even if the candidate chooses to run on a conservative platform, his seat counts
for determining whether the Democrats are the majority party in Congress, with the associated
privileges for possibly more liberal Democratic party leaders). This may make it diﬃcult for a
Democrat to win in very conservative districts, even if he adapted a very conservative platform.
For example, in the 2006 elections, many Republican House candidates tried to tie their Democratic
opponents to “liberal Nancy Pelosi”, the prospective Speaker of the House in case of a Democratic
majority. A related case in point is the 2006 Senate race in Rhode Island, which the incumbent,
Senator Lincoln Chafee (a relatively liberal Republican) narrowly lost (47% to 53%) in spite of
being personally very popular. In exit polls, 63% of voters approved of Chafee’s job performance as
U.S. Senator and 51% of voters said that Chafee’s position on issues was “about right” (and only
25% said that he was too conservative). However, by an overwhelming margin (63%-23%), voters
stated that they wanted Democrats rather than Republicans in control of the Senate.8
Also, note that most senators from states that usually vote for Democrats in the presidential
election are Democrats and vice versa. In a naive Downsian model without constraints on the
policy platforms, candidates adopt the position of the median voter in their respective district, and
6Even belonging to a “political dynasty” (i.e., being a relative of other politicians) may be interpreted as a ﬁxed
characteristic; see Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder (2006) for a study that explores the importance of this characteristic
for electoral success.
7Note, however, that if we instead focus on the nominating behavior of parties, then fewer positions should be
considered ﬁxed than for any particular candidate. For example, while the party can choose whether to nominate a
man or a woman, each candidate has his gender not as a choice variable.
8See http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006//pages/results/states/RI/S/01/epolls.0.html for these exit poll re-
sults.
4win with equal probability. Hence, while the Downsian model predicts that both Democratic and
Republican candidates in conservative districts adopt more conservative positions than in liberal
districts, it cannot explain why Republicans win signiﬁcantly more of the conservative districts
than Democrats and vice versa. In contrast, the ﬁxed positions in our framework can generate this
result in a natural way.
3 Majority Eﬃciency
3.1 Deﬁnition
The central result for political competition in a Downsian framework is that candidates propose
policies that appeal to the median voter. This median voter result corresponds to a notion that
political competition forces candidates to propose “popular” rather than “unpopular” policies in
order win elections. “Moving toward the median” (from a non-median initial position) is popular
in the Downsian model because it is preferred by majority of the electorate.
In contrast, there is no geometric notion of a “median voter” in our model, because voters
have general preferences over multi-dimensional policy vectors. However, our concept of majority-
eﬃciency captures the fundamental idea that a particular policy a is more moderate than some
some other policy a′ if a is preferred to a′ by a majority of voters. We deﬁne a policy to be majority-
eﬃcient if a majority of voters prefers the proposed policy to any other policy that a candidate
could choose. In other words, a majority-eﬃcient policy is the most popular policy a candidate can
choose, subject to the constraints imposed by his ﬁxed positions. The central question is whether
candidates will be moderate, i.e., choose majority-eﬃcient positions in equilibrium.
We ﬁrst deﬁne majority preferences over policies. The deﬁnition accounts for the fact that some
voters may be indiﬀerent between a and a′. We cannot solely require that at least 50% of voters
ﬁnd a at least as good as a′, because, if some citizens are indiﬀerent, it can be the case that also
more than 50% of citizens ﬁnd a′ at least as good as a. Thus, our deﬁnition compares the number
of citizens who ﬁnd a at least as good as a′ with the number of citizens who ﬁnd a′ at least as good
as a.
Deﬁnition 1
1. Let a,a′ ∈ A. Then a is majority preferred to a′, denoted by a   a′, if and only if
µ({θ|uθ(a) ≥ uθ(a′)}) ≥ µ({θ|uθ(a′) ≥ uθ(a)}).
2. a is strictly majority preferred to a′, denoted by a ≻ a′, if a   a′ but not a′   a.
We are now ready to introduce the deﬁnition of majority-eﬃciency.
Deﬁnition 2 Candidate j’s policy a∗ ∈ Aj is majority-eﬃcient if and only if a∗   a for all
a ∈ Aj.
Note that a policy is majority-eﬃcient if and only if it is a Condorcet winner relative to the set
of policies that a candidate can choose. In general, the smaller the set of feasible policies is, the
more likely it is that a majority-eﬃcient policy in such a set exists. In fact, it is straightforward
to ﬁnd examples in which majority-eﬃcient policies exist, but there is no Condorcet winner in
the traditional sense (where all positions can be chosen). Thus, recognizing that candidates are
in practice ﬁxed on many positions, and restricting the comparison set to a candidate’s feasible
policies, makes majority-eﬃciency a much more applicable concept than that of a Condorcet winner.
53.2 Majority-eﬃciency as a normative concept
Majority-eﬃciency can also be interpreted as a normative concept. Pareto optimality is the stan-
dard normative concept in economics, but it has little bite in political settings, because, very often,
most policies are Pareto optimal. For example, in the Downsian model, all policies located between
the two most extreme voters’ bliss points are Pareto optima. Similarly, in our more general model,
a policy is guaranteed to be a Pareto optimum if it is the most preferred one for one voter. However,
we usually do not consider policies that are supported only by a small minority as eﬃcient.
While Pareto eﬃciency is the appropriate eﬃciency concept for measuring the performance of
economic exchange institutions, majority-eﬃciency appears to be the more appropriate concept for
measuring the eﬃciency of democracy. The institution of a market is characterized by voluntary
exchange; any transaction must lead to a Pareto improvement for the set of individuals who par-
ticipate in it, otherwise at least one individual can veto the exchange. Pareto eﬃciency then asks
whether the entirety of all trades that occur within the market institution lead to an allocation that
exhausts all potential eﬃciency gains, in the sense that it does not allow further improvements for
the set of all individuals. In contrast, democracy is characterized by a “dictatorship of the major-
ity”, in the sense that a majority of people can impose a policy on all citizens. In two candidate
elections, the majority-preferred candidate wins, and thus the election leads to an outcome that is
majority-preferred relative to the other candidate and his platform. The relevant question for the
institutional eﬃciency of democracy is then whether the entirety of the political process (including
the platform choice by candidates) leads to a majority-eﬃcient solution.9
The major alternative concept to Pareto eﬃciency used in the literature is utilitarianism. A
policy is considered eﬃcient if it maximizes the sum of the utilities of all voters. Typically, there is
only one such policy. The concept thus generates a sharp benchmark against which we can measure
the outcome of the political system. However, in order for the concept to make sense, the cardinal
value of individual utilities must be meaningful, and we must be willing to trade-oﬀ the utility of
diﬀerent individuals in a particular way.
Proponents of utilitarianism have argued that the right policy was that which would cause
“the greatest happiness of the greatest number” of people, a quote usually ascribed to Jeremy
Bentham. The obvious problem in formalising this theory is that choosing a policy that maximizes
utility for all people is usually not possible. Utilitarianism has been interpreted as equivalent to
maximizing the sum of voters’ utilities, but that is not the only possible interpretation. The concept
of majority-eﬃciency is quite close to the original quote in that it requires that a policy achieve a
“greater happiness for the greater number of people” than any other policy.
9Note that we can see majority-eﬃciency and Pareto eﬃciency as the two extreme endpoints of a general concept
that we can call α-eﬃciency, deﬁned as follows: A policy a is α-eﬃcient if the percentage of people who prefer a
′ to
a (among all people with a strict preference) is not more than 1 − α, for all other policies a
′. Clearly, as long as the
α deﬁned this way is positive for a policy (or ≥ 1/N, in a ﬁnite electorate with N voters), then the policy is Pareto
eﬃcient. Majority eﬃciency corresponds to α = 1/2. The higher α, the more stringent is the requirement that no
other policy is preferred by a fraction 1−α of voters, so it is clear that the set of majority-eﬃcient policies is always
a subset of the set of Pareto optimal policies. More generally, the higher α, the fewer policies are α-eﬃcient, and
the more likely it is that no α-eﬃcient policy exists. In contrast, for α suﬃciently low, an α-eﬃcient policy exists
in almost all applications. A suﬃcient condition for the existence of a Pareto optimum is that there is at least one
voter who has a bliss policy (a policy that he strictly prefers to all other policies) – that policy is a Pareto optimum.
Even a Pareto optimum is not guaranteed to exist in all settings. For example, suppose that all individuals prefer
policy (0,0,...) to policy (1,1,...), and for all other policies, all voters prefer a policy a to a policy a
′, if policy a
starts with a longer string of ‘1’s before having the ﬁrst 0. In this economy, no α-eﬃcient policy exists for any α.
For example, note that the result of Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1988) can be interpreted as follows: In a multidimensional
Euclidean voting model, under certain assumptions on the distribution of preferences (and with no ﬁxed policies),
1
e-eﬃcient policies exist (where e = 2.71... is Euler’s number).
64 Results
In Section 4.1, we provide some results concerning the relation between majority-eﬃciency and
equilibrium that hold for general preferences of voters. In general, majority-eﬃcient positions (or
a pure strategy equilibrium) may not exist. Therefore, we analyze two classes of preferences. In
Section 4.2 we consider preferences that eﬀectively reduce the policy space to one dimension. In
contrast, in Section 4.3, we consider the truly multidimensional weighted-issue model.
4.1 Results for General Preferences
Our ﬁrst result obtains in a setting in which both candidates have exactly the same set of feasible
policies. This means that ﬁxed positions do not matter, either because they are irrelevant for all
voters, or because they are the same for both candidates. Obviously, the assumption that both
candidates share the same characteristics and ﬁxed policy positions is not very realistic, but this is
an important benchmark: To our knowledge, all previous models in which candidates can choose a
position, abstract from ﬁxed positions.
Theorem 1 Suppose that A0 = A1:
1. Then (a0,a1) is a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if both a0 and a1 are majority-eﬃcient.
2. Suppose a majority-eﬃcient policy exists. If (σ0,σ1) is a mixed strategy equilibrium, then
almost every policy in the support of σ0 and σ1 is majority-eﬃcient.
Theorem 1 should be interpreted as highlighting the role of ﬁxed positions for all majority-
ineﬃciency results in this paper, and indeed, for any such result in other frameworks. One interest-
ing issue is, for example, whether there are any models, with general preferences for voters, in which
oﬃce-motivated candidates have a strict incentive to diﬀerentiate from their opponent for electoral
gain.10 Theorem 1, point 1, can be interpreted as showing the crucial role of ﬁxed positions for
any such model. If there are no diﬀerences between the candidates’ ﬁxed positions, then a pure
strategy equilibrium with diﬀerentiation exists only if there are two (or more) majority-eﬃcient
policies.11 Moreover, even if this is the case (say, there are two majority-eﬃcient policies, a and b),
there are also equilibria in which both candidates choose the same policy (that is, (a,a) and (b,b)
are equilibria), and in all equilibria, candidates are indiﬀerent between playing a and b, so there is
never a strict incentive for candidates to diﬀerentiate. The same is obviously true for symmetric
mixed strategy equilibria.
Our second general result obtains in a setting where the two candidates may have diﬀerent ﬁxed
positions. If a candidate has the ability to choose a policy that is majority-preferred to any other
policy that either candidate can choose, then choosing this policy guarantees a victory. If both
candidates have access to this policy, then the unique equilibrium is that both candidates choose it.
If only one candidate has access, then this candidate can force a victory by adopting it; however,
if he is suﬃciently better than his opponent in the ﬁxed positions, then he might also win for sure
with other policies, so there may be majority-ineﬃcient equilibria.
Theorem 2 Suppose there exists a∗ ∈ Aj such that a∗ ≻ a for all a ∈ A0∪A1. Then there exists a
pure strategy equilibrium in which Candidate j plays a∗. Furthermore, if a∗ ∈ A0∩A1, then (a∗,a∗)
10We are grateful to Ernesto Dal Bo for raising this question.
11This result generalizes Ledyard (1984), who shows in a Downsian model where voters have voting costs that the
two candidates converge to the bliss point of the median voter.
7is the unique equilibrium. Otherwise, if a∗ / ∈ A−j, then Candidate j wins with probability 1 in any
equilibrium.
The setting of Theorem 2 is one in which one candidate is superior, in the sense that he cannot be
beaten (at least strictly) by the other candidate. However, in a framework with general preferences,
it can easily be the case that each candidate has a majority-eﬃcient policy (relative to his own set
of feasible policies), but no candidate has access to a policy that is majority-preferred to all policies
that his opponent could choose. This is, in particular, true if there are some ﬁxed attributes in
which a majority of voters prefers Candidate 0, and other attributes in which the majority prefers
Candidate 1. (We will provide very natural examples for such a scenario in Section 4.4 below).
4.2 Scoring Preferences
While Theorems 1 and 2 hold for general preferences, we need to impose more structure on citizens’
preferences to prove existence of majority-eﬃcient policies. In this section, we analyze preferences
similar to the standard one-dimensional Downsian model, and in Section 4.3, we analyze a truly
multidimensional model that we call the weighted-issue model.
In the standard one-dimensional Hotelling-Downsian model, policies and voter bliss points can
be expressed as a number in the interval [0,1]. In our scoring model, a candidate’s policy a is ﬁrst
translated into an overall, one-dimensional score x = f(a) that can be interpreted as a measure of
how liberal or how conservative the candidate is. All citizens agree on the scoring function (i.e., for
any two policy vectors proposed by the candidates, they agree on which one is more conservative),
but they have diﬀerent ideal points, depending on their type θ.
For example, if f(a) = 1−λ
λ
 ∞
i=1 ai(λ)i, then the score is a weighted sum of the a politician’s
position on each issue. (The factor (1 − λ)/λ normalizes the sum such that the score is in [0,1]
for all policies a). This method resembles the calculation of legislative scores by lobby groups such
as the ACLU and NRA for members of the U.S. congress. Note that two candidates can have
the same policy score, even though their policy vectors diﬀer. For example, for λ = 0.5, policy
(0,1,1,1,...) and policy (1,0,0,0,...) both result in a score of 0.5.12 For citizens with scoring
preferences, only the weighted percentage of liberal and conservative positions matters, but not the
position on speciﬁc issues.
Formally, the utility of type θ ∈ R is given by
uθ(a) = v(θ,f(a)); (1)
where each v: R2 → R. Assume furthermore that
∂2v(θ,x)
∂θ∂x > 0, which implies that higher θ-types
(i.e., more conservative citizens) prefer a candidate with a higher score (i.e, a more conservative
policy score).
Theorem 3 shows that both candidates adopt majority-eﬃcient policies in the scoring model,
even if candidates’ choice of policies is restricted due to ﬁxed issues.
Theorem 3 Suppose that citizens’ utilities are of the form uθ(a) = v(θ,f(a)), where f is real
valued and continuous. Suppose that
∂2v(θ,x)
∂θ∂x > 0 and that there exists a unique median voter θm,
i.e., µ({θ ≤ θm}) ≥ 0.5 and µ({θ ≥ θm}) ≥ 0.5. Then
1. Policy aj∗ is majority-eﬃcient if and only if aj∗ solves maxaj∈Aj uθm(aj).
12While for λ = 0.5 these are the only two sequences that lead to an eﬀective policy of 0.5, there is an inﬁnite
number of such sequences for λ > 0.5.
82. (a0∗,a1∗) is an equilibrium.
3. If there exists an equilibrium in which one candidate i chooses a non-majority-eﬃcient po-
sition, then one of the candidates wins with probability 1. The election outcome of such an
equilibrium is the same as in (a0∗,a1∗).
In the scoring model, the median voter’s most preferred positions are majority-eﬃcient. If, as in
the standard Downsian model, both candidates can implement the median voter’s most preferred
policy, then the median voter is indiﬀerent between the two candidates, and they win with equal
probability. With ﬁxed positions, a majority-eﬃcient equilibrium continues to exist. If, however,
one of the candidates is suﬃciently inferior then additional equilibria arise that are ineﬃcient. In
particular, if the inferior candidate cannot win, then his actions are irrelevant and he can choose
any policy. The superior candidate can select any policy that is not “too far” from the majority
eﬃcient policy, i.e., any policy that the median voter prefers to the inferior candidate’s best policy.
Thus, the quality of the inferior candidate puts a limit on the extent of a possible ineﬃciency in
the worst equilibrium.
While Theorem 3 provides a reassuring eﬃciency result, the interpretation of the scoring model
in a multi-issue context is problematic. First, in order to appeal to the median voter, a left-wing
candidate (i.e., a candidate who is exogenously committed to several zeros) would mostly choose
conservative positions (i.e., 1) on pledgeable issues, and vice versa for a right-wing candidate. Thus,
on ﬂexible issues, the model predicts that liberal candidates takes more conservative positions in
equilibrium than their conservative opponents. While candidates may occasionally “moderate”
themselves in such a way, there also appears to be the opposite behavior, which the Downsian
model cannot explain.
Second, the majority-eﬃciency result implies that every position taken by a candidate on pledge-
able issues is popular with the majority of the electorate.13 In reality, it appears that candidates
sometimes take minority positions on some issues and do well. Since majority-eﬃciency is a very
robust result in the Downsian model, it may appear that a model with more complicated features
(say, regarding the motivations of politicians and the information of the electorate) is needed to
explain such a behavior.14 However, we will see in the next sections that the majority-eﬃciency
result is a speciﬁc feature of the Downsian model, and that the weighted-issue model provides a
simple explanation of why oﬃce motivated candidates may choose majority-ineﬃcient positions in
order to maximize their electoral success probability.
Third, if candidates successfully achieve convergence in the Downsian model, all voters are
approximately indiﬀerent between them. This is true even if candidates propose diﬀerent policies
on the issues, because, for voters with scoring preferences, only the proportion of liberal and
conservative positions count. In contrast, if voters care about positions on diﬀerent issues in a
meaningful way (as in the weighted-issue model of the next section), then very few voters, if any,
are indiﬀerent between candidates in equilibrium. Note, for example, that 71% of respondents in a
2004 Gallup poll indicated that they had a strong preference for their candidate in the 2004 U.S.
presidential election.15
13This is true even if the two candidates take opposite positions on some issue. With scoring preferences, the
majority of the electorate would like an otherwise left-wing candidate to take the conservative position, and an
otherwise right-wing candidate to take the liberal position on the same issue.
14For example, Kartik and McAfee (2006) motivate their model with an example of John McCain, who took the
(unpopular) position of opposing ethanol subsidies before the 2000 Iowa caucuses. They then build a signaling model
in which some politicians have “character”, which compels them to take unpopular positions, but where the electorate
ceteris paribus prefers candidates with “character”.
15See, e.g., Bernhardt, Krasa, and Polborn (2006) for further documentation of polarized preferences in U.S.
presidential elections.
94.3 Majority Eﬃciency in the Weighted-Issue Model
In the weighted-issue model, each citizen has a preferred position (0 or 1) on each issue, and utility
is linearly-additive across issues. A citizen compares the two candidates by looking at how often
they agree with him on issues. We allow for issues to have diﬀerent weights for a voter, and for
the weights to vary among individuals. The weighted-issue model is a natural and quite general
framework to capture preferences of individuals in a multidimensional policy setting. It is similar to
a multidimensional Euclidean model, but the binary nature of policy makes it much more tractable.
Formally, in the weighted-issue model, a citizens’s type is given by θ ∈
 ∞
i=0 Θi, where Θ0 is an




λi,θ0|θi − ai|, (2)
where all λi,θ0 ≥ 0 and
 ∞
i=1 λi,θ0 < ∞. Parameter θ0 determines the weights (λi,θ0)i∈N that a
citizen puts on the diﬀerent issues. For i ≥ 1, θi ∈ {0,1} denotes a citizen’s preferred position on
policy i. Clearly, this framework also accommodates settings with ﬁnitely many issues by ﬁxing
λi,θ0 = 0 for all but a ﬁnite number of issues.
Theorem 4 and its corollaries provide conditions under which majority eﬃcient policies exist
in the weighted-issue model. In all results of this section, we assume that the distribution of issue
weights in the utility function (2) is independent from the distribution over ideal points. More
formally, we assume that the following condition is satisﬁed:
Independence Condition. Let µ be the distribution of citizen characteristics. Then the marginal
distribution over weights, µΘ0, is independent of the marginal distribution over ideal points, µQ∞
i=1 Θi.
Theorem 4 Suppose that all voters have preferences of the form given by (2), and that µ and µ′
are distributions of voter types that satisfy the independence condition. Let aj ∈ Aj be a majority-













for all measurable sets C−k ⊂ Θ−k.
Intuitively, Theorem 4 shows that, if we start from a setting in which a majority eﬃcient policy
aj exists and then increase the number of citizens who prefer the majority eﬃcient policy on some
issue k (while leaving the preference distribution on the other issues unaﬀected), then aj remains
majority eﬃcient. Theorem 4 suggests that the existence of majority-eﬃcient policies is relatively
robust in the weighted issue model, in the sense that the distribution of citizens can be changed in
a generic way without aﬀecting the existence of a majority eﬃcient policy. This robustness result
contrasts sharply with the multidimensional Euclidean model of Plott (1967), in which each voter
is indiﬀerent between all policies that have the same distance from his bliss point. In that model,
a majority eﬃcient policy corresponds to a Condorcet winner (as there are no ﬁxed positions).
Plott shows that a Condorcet winner exists if and only if the distribution of voter ideal points is
radially symmetric around one voter’s ideal point (i.e., that voter is the “median in all directions”).
This existence condition is highly non-generic: Starting from a radially symmetric distribution and
changing the ideal point of only one voter usually destroys radial symmetry. This is true even if,
in the spirit of our Theorem 4, we move that voter’s ideal point closer to the previous median, as
long as we don’t move him exactly on the straight line that connects the median with the voter’s
previous ideal point. In contrast, in the weighted-issue model, we can change an initial distribution
10that admits a majority-eﬃcient policy in a large number of ways and preserve existence.16
We now elaborate on this point through a series of corollaries and examples to provide a number
of existence results. First, repeated application of Theorem 4 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that preferences are given by (2). Let µk, k ∈ N be distributions on Θ
satisfying the independence condition, with limk→∞ µk
Θ−0(C) = µΘ−0(C) for all closed subsets C of
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Figure 1: Existence and Non-Existence of Majority-eﬃcient Policies
Example 1 Suppose there are three issues that enter utility with the same weight, i.e., uθ(a) =
−
 3
i=1 |ai − θi|, and the candidate can choose positions on all of them. The distribution of voter
types is given in Figure 1. Note that a citizen’s disutility is given by the distance, measured along
the edges of the cube, between the voter’s location and the proposed policy.
In panel (A), where voter preferences are uniformly distributed, it is obvious that any policy,
for example (1,1,1), is majority-eﬃcient. Starting from Panel (A), we shift a mass of 2.5% from
16Also, the assumption in Theorem 4 that the weight of issues in the citizens’ utility functions is distributed
independently of their preferred position simpliﬁes the proof, but is by no means a necessary condition for the
existence of a majority-eﬃcient position. That is, starting from a situation in which a majority-eﬃcient position
exists, we can introduce some correlation between issue weights and preferred policy positions without (generically)
aﬀecting existence.
17Consider the product topology on Θ−0. The basis for the topology is given by all cylinder sets {θ1}×···×{θi}×
{0,1}
N.
11(0,0,0) to each of the three neighboring vertices (1,0,0), (0,1,0) and (0,0,1), respectively. By
Corollary 1, (1,1,1) remains majority-eﬃcient. Panel (C) is generated from panel (B) by shifting
the mass of voters at (0,0,1) to (0,1,1). Thus, the weight of {0,1}×{1}×{0,1} increases, while the
percentage of citizens with characteristics in {1} × {0,1}2 and {0,1}2 × {1} is unchanged. Hence,
(1,1,1) remains majority-eﬃcient in panel (C).
Generally, any distribution that “ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates” the uniform one (in the
sense that it can be generated by starting from the uniform distribution and shifting voter mass
“upwards”) has (1,1,1) as majority-eﬃcient policy.
In contrast, while for each issue a majority of citizens prefers position 1 in panel (D), this
preference distribution cannot be generated through a series of “upward” mass shifts, starting from
a uniform distribution. (We cannot get 20% weight on each of the nodes adjoining (0,0,0) just
from shifting upwards the 1/8 mass on (0,0,0) in panel (A)). No majority-eﬃcient policy exists
in panel (D): Start with (1,1,1). 60% of citizens prefer (0,0,0). However, (0,1,0) is majority
preferred to (0,0,0) (because it is closer to the ideal points of citizens at (0,1,0) and (1,1,1)), but
(0,1,1) is majority preferred to (0,1,0). Finally, (0,1,1) is dominated by (1,1,1). By symmetry,
all other policies are also not majority-eﬃcient.
Corollary 2 below shows that, if there are only two pledgeable issues and if all citizens have the
same issue weights in their respective utility functions, then majority-eﬃcient policies always exist.
Thus, Corollary 2 shows that panel (D) in the above example presents the simplest situation in
which non-existence of majority-eﬃcient policies can occur.
Corollary 2 Suppose that preferences are given by (2) and that µ satisﬁed the independence as-
sumption. Suppose that |Sj| ≤ 2 (i.e., all but two policies are ﬁxed). Then a majority-eﬃcient
policy exists.
Again, the contrast to Plott (1967) is sharp, because in that model, majority-eﬃcient positions
almost never exist.18 Corollary 2 also has a practical signiﬁcance. A number of interesting examples
can already be generated with one or two ﬂexible issues, and in all these applications, existence is
guaranteed.
The next corollary shows that, if the distribution of preferred positions is independent across
issues, then majority-eﬃcient policies always exist. As stated in Example 1, all policies are majority-
eﬃcient if the preference distribution is uniform. Increasing the likelihood that a citizen prefers
one outcome, say 1, on issue i to pi means that we raise µ({1} × Θ−i) from 0.5 to pi > 0.5. Thus,
a policy a which sets ai = 1 remains majority-eﬃcient. Using corollary 1, this argument can be
repeated for all issues i, thereby proving the following result.
Corollary 3 Suppose that preferences are given by (2) and that all marginal distributions µΘi,
i ≥ 0 are independent. Then policy aj is majority eﬃcient if and only if a
j
i = 1 when µΘi(θi) > 0.5
and a
j
i = 0 when µΘi(θi) < 0.5 for all i ∈ Sj.
4.4 Adoption of Minority Positions in the Weighted-Issue Model
We have shown above that majority-eﬃcient positions for candidates often exist in the weighted-
issue model. In this section, we analyze whether candidates choose these majority-eﬃcient positions
18A result similar to Corollary 2, but based on very diﬀerent assumptions, is derived by Bade (2006). She shows, in
a two-dimensional Euclidean model, that an equilibrium of the game between candidates exists (located at the median
in each dimension), if candidates are uncertain about the shape of voters’ indiﬀerence curves and are uncertainty-
averse (rather than expected-utility maximizers).
12in equilibrium and ﬁnd that this is often not the case. Fundamentally, the reason for ineﬃciency
results is the following: When choosing a stand on an issue, candidates consider whether a particular
position will win or lose more votes. In other words, they care about swing voters. The scoring
model has the special property that a policy position that wins votes from swing voters is also
always good for a majority of voters, but this is not true in general.
As a practical example for the optimality of adopting minority positions (i.e., majority-ineﬃcient
policies), consider the policy towards (illegal) immigration in the 2006 U.S. congressional elections.
A majority of the electorate appears to favor tougher measures against illegal immigrants. For ex-
ample, Propositions 102 and 300, which banned illegal immigrants from receiving punitive damages
in civil lawsuits and from certain public services, passed in Arizona with a large majority of more
than 70%, respectively. Yet, an anti-immigrant platform appears to have backﬁred for Republican
candidates, by losing more Hispanic votes than gaining white votes.19
Another model in the literature that provides an explanation for this phenomenon is the proba-
bilistic voting model pioneered by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) (henceforth PVM; see Persson and
Tabellini (2000) for a review of the various developments of this literature). In the PVM, voters
are divided in diﬀerent groups according to their utility from policies (that are choice variables for
candidates), a common utility shock (like valence) to all voters in a group, and an idiosyncratic
“ideology” shock to individual voters. In equilibrium, both candidates choose the same policy
platform, which maximizes a weighted sum of utility of diﬀerent groups in society. The weight of
a group in the candidates’ objective function is higher than its population share, if voters in the
group are more “movable”, i.e. if they are relatively likely to switch to a candidate who oﬀers them
a more favorable policy position. Thus, interpreting the above example in the PVM framework,
one would conclude that, while most voters had a mild preference for an anti-immigration policy,
those voters who had the opposite preference cared suﬃciently more strongly about this issue to
make adoption of an anti-immigrant platform an electoral mistake for a candidate.
Example 2 is based on a analogous eﬀect. Note, however, that the weighted-issue framework
is a lot simpler than the PVM: In the PVM, there are a number of exogenous random shocks,
and members of a group with the same interests about issues must be suﬃciently diﬀerentiated
“ideologically” (i.e., in a dimension that cannot be addressed by the candidates) for an equilibrium
to exist. In contrast, Example 2 is completely deterministic.
Example 2 There are two issues, where the ﬁrst issue (e.g., party aﬃliation) is ﬁxed for both
candidates. There are four types, characterized by a pair (θ1,θ2), θi ∈ {0,1}. Types (0,0) and
(1,0) have utility functions uθ(a) = −0.5|θ1 −a1|−0.2|θ2 −a2|. Types (0,1) and (1,1) have utility
functions uθ(a) = −0.5|θ1 − a1| − |θ2 − a2|. Types are stochastically independently distributed.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that θ2 = 1 for 20% and θ1 = 1 for p ∈ (37.5%,62.5%).
Since a majority of citizens prefers a2 = 0, any majority-eﬃcient policy must have a2 = 0.
However, (0,0) and (1,0) are not equilibrium policies. First, suppose that p ≤ 0.5, i.e., in equi-
librium Candidate 1 wins at most with probability 0.5. If Candidate 1 deviates and oﬀers (1,1),
then types (0,1) will now vote for Candidate 1. Thus, Candidate 1 receives a vote proportion of
p + (1 − p)0.2 > 0.5, so that he wins with probability 1, a contradiction. Similarly, if p ≥ 0.5 it
follows that Candidate 0 wins if he chooses a2 = 1. Note that the example is robust, i.e., small
perturbations of the distribution of citizens and of preferences do not change the result.
In the PVM, the only reason for the adoption of majority-ineﬃcient positions by candidates is
19While it is hard to measure the electoral eﬀects of a speciﬁc issue precisely, this argument is made, for example,
in Blumenthal (2006) and Kirkpatrick (2006). Also, two prominent members of the anti-immigrant wing of the
Republican Party in Arizona (J.D. Hayworth and Randy Graf) lost their races in previously Republican-held districts.
13that the minority cares more intensely about an issue than the majority. In contrast, Example 3
shows that, in the weighted-issue model, minority positions may be adopted in equilibrium even if
the issue weights are the same for all citizens, and preferred policy positions on diﬀerent issues are
independently distributed. Thus, Example 3 warns against interpreting the adoption of minority
positions as evidence that the minority cares more intensely about a particular issue. Also, in
Example 3, one candidate wants to choose a diﬀerent policy from his opponent, while the other
one wants to mimic his opponent. In contrast, candidates’ platforms always converge in the PVM.
Example 3 There are three issues. Candidate 0’s and 1’s position on the ﬁrst two issues are ﬁxed
to (0,1) and (1,0), respectively. They can choose a position on issue 3. A voter’s type is given by
(θ1,θ2,θ3), with µ(θ1 = 1) = 0.4, µ(θ2 = 1) = 0.2 and µ(θ3 = 1) = 0.4. The realizations of the θi





















(0,0,0) 28.8 0.2 0.7 −0.3
(0,0,1) 19.2 0.2 −0.3 0.7
(0,1,0) 7.2 1.8 2.3 1.3
(0,1,1) 4.8 1.8 1.3 2.3
(1,0,0) 19.2 −1.8 −1.3 −2.3
(1,0,1) 12.8 −1.8 −2.3 −1.3
(1,1,0) 4.8 −0.2 0.3 −0.7
(1,1,1) 3.2 −0.2 −0.7 0.3
Candidate 0’s vote share 60 45.6 34.4
Table 1: Citizen Preferences and Vote Shares
Note that Candidate 0 is the “stronger” candidate in the following sense: If both candidates
choose the same policy on issue 3, then Candidate 0 has the support of all types with θ1 = 0, which
constitute 60% of the population. However, Candidate 1 can win by oﬀering a diﬀerent policy
on issue 3. To see this, consider Table 1, which shows the net-payoﬀs of citizens from choosing
Candidate 0 over Candidate 1. Clearly, a citizen votes for Candidate 0 if and only if this net-payoﬀ
is positive.
Candidate 0’s vote share in the bottom line of the table indicates that Candidate 0 wins when-
ever both candidates choose the same policy, while Candidate 1 wins whenever they choose diﬀer-
ent policies on issue 3. Therefore, there is no equilibrium in which candidates always choose the
majority-eﬃcient policy a
j
3 = 0. Structurally, candidates play a “matching pennies game”, so that
each of them randomizes, in equilibrium, with equal probability over the two policies. Hence, the
majority-eﬃcient policy is only implemented with probability 1/2.
To gain intuition for Example 3, note that citizens with preferences (0,1) on the ﬁrst two issues
always vote for Candidate 0, and those with preference (1,0) always vote for Candidate 1. The
potential swing voters are citizens with preference (0,0) or (1,1) on the ﬁrst two issues, but there
are many more with preference (0,0) than with (1,1) (48% vs. 8%). If both candidates choose
0 on the third issue, then all (0,0) types vote for Candidate 0, who therefore wins. If, instead,
Candidate 1 diﬀerentiates from his competitor and picks the less popular position (1) on the third
14policy, he wins 40% of the (0,0) types (19.2% of the electorate), while losing 60% of the (1,1) types
to his competitor (a loss of only 4.8% of the electorate). The net gain of 14.4% of the electorate is
enough for Candidate 1 to swing the election in his favor.
Note that swing voters in Example 3 have the same preference distribution over issue 3 as
the general population, and also put the same weight on this issue as the rest of the population.
Thus, in Example 3, the success of adopting a minority position has nothing to do with diﬀerential
preference intensity. Rather, if the distribution of swing voters is asymmetric (as it arises here quite
naturally from the other positions of the candidates, even without assuming any correlation), then
the “weaker” candidate, who has fewer swing voters to defend, beneﬁts if he opens a controversy
on an additional issue in which the candidates diﬀer.
Note that such a diﬀerentiation result cannot be obtained in the Downsian model, because of
its one-dimensional structure: There is only one group of swing voters (i.e., those at or close to
the median of the distribution), and thus, candidates have to deliver a policy that is popular with
this one group. Furthermore, in the Downsian model, a policy that the median voter likes is also
preferred by a majority of the population. This leads to a presumption that candidates should pick
popular positions in order to maximize their probability of winning,20 but this argument logically
only applies in the Downsian framework.
Finally, it is instructive to compare Example 3 with Aragones and Palfrey (2002) who analyze
a one-dimensional Downsian model with oﬃce-motivated candidates, an uncertain position of the
median voter and one candidate (say, the Democrat) who has a small valence advantage (e.g.,
is more competent, which is appreciated by all citizens). In order to have a chance of winning,
the Republican candidate has to diﬀerentiate himself from the Democrat, while the Democrat
wins if both candidates adopt a position close to each other. No pure strategy equilibrium exists,
and depending on the platforms chosen by the candidates in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the
Democrat gets the votes of either all left-wing voters, or all right-wing voters, or all voters (the
latter happens when the two candidates choose a position that is suﬃciently close to each other).
Furthermore, the Republican can win only if he chooses the ex-post “more moderate” position (i.e.,
is closer to the realized median voter).
In comparison, in Example 3, Candidate 1 also has an incentive to diﬀerentiate, while Candi-
date 0 has an incentive to mimic his opponent. In contrast to Aragones and Palfrey (2002), however,
there is no uncertainty about the voters’ preference distribution in Example 3. More fundamentally,
the nature of the advantage of one of the candidates is diﬀerent: The Democrat in Aragones and
Palfrey (2002) is strictly preferred by all voters if the candidates choose the same policy position.
In contrast, there are two ﬁxed issues with diverse preferences in our example, so that Candidate 0
is preferred by a majority if the candidates choose the same position on the third issue, but diﬀerent
voter types diﬀer in their preferred position on the third issue. Depending on the two platforms,
a candidate can attract and lose several diﬀerent “swing voter” groups and not just shift a “cutoﬀ
voter” as in a one-dimensional model. Also, because candidates are diﬀerentiated in their ﬁxed
position, each candidate has “core supporters”, that is, voters who always support him, indepen-
dent of the platform choice of the candidates on the pledgeable issues; this property of our model
appears empirically more plausible than the complete ﬂexibility of voter-candidate assignments in
the Downsian model. Lastly, the weaker candidate in our model (considering the preferences only
over the ﬁxed issues) can even win by adopting the “more extremist” (i.e., minority-preferred)
position on the third issue, which is not possible in Aragones and Palfrey’s model.
20See, for example, Kartik and McAfee (2006) for such an argument.
155 Uncertainty, Majority-Eﬃcieny, and Competition-Eﬃciency
We now generalize the model to incorporate uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In Section 5.1,
we analyze the eﬀects of valence uncertainty. This uncertainty is resolved after the candidates
select policies but before citizens vote.21 Valence is a quality of the candidate that all voters value
and that does not aﬀect any voter’s preferences over a candidate’s policies. We provide a general
deﬁnition of valence and characterize conditions for the economy that guarantee that candidates
choose majority-eﬃcient platforms in a model with valence uncertainty.
In Section 5.2, we analyze the impact of uncertainty about the distribution of voter preferences
on the eﬃciency of the candidates’ platform choices. To do this, we ﬁrst need to generalize our
deﬁnition of majority-eﬃciency to take into account that the majority-preference depends on the
state of the world. We also deﬁne competition-eﬃciency, a concept that asks whether a social
planner would be able to make a majority better oﬀ (in expectation), if he were able to choose both
candidates’ platforms. We show that, in a weighted issue model with type uncertainty, candidates
can opposing platforms that are not competition eﬃcient. In Section 5.3, we analyze type and
valence uncertainty in the scoring model.
5.1 Valence Uncertainty
An important model in the literature that introduces some multidimensionality into the standard
Downsian framework is a one-dimensional policy model in which voters care also about a candidate’s
“valence”. Valence is interpreted as a characteristic of the candidate that all voters appreciate (like
competence or honesty). While most models in the literature simply assume that valence enters as
a linearly additive shock into all voters’ utility functions, the following deﬁnition is somewhat more
general. It says that valence does not aﬀect preferences over a candidate’s policies.
Deﬁnition 3 Let uθ(ai,κi) be the utility of voter type θ from Candidate i’s proposed policy ai,
if the state of the world is κ = (κ1,κ2) ∈ R2. The state κ is a valence shock if and only if
uθ(ai,κi) ≥ uθ(ˆ ai,κi) ⇐⇒ uθ(ai, ˆ κi) ≥ uθ(ˆ ai, ˆ κi), for all κi, ˆ κi ∈ R, for all policies ai ∈ Ai and for
all citizens θ.
Under what conditions do candidates in a valence model choose majority-eﬃcient policies?
Clearly, this will not be the case in general, because majority-ineﬃcient equilibria arise in the
weighted issue model, even without valence shocks.22 It turns out that a suﬃcient condition for
candidates to choose a majority-eﬃcient policy is that a society is “polarized” over policy, i.e.,
citizens can be ordered from left to right such that each policy change is beneﬁcial either to all
citizens θ that are further to the left (or further to the right) than some citizen θc.
Formally, let Θi(a0,a1,κ) := {θ|uθ(ai,κi) ≥ uθ(a−i,κ−i)} be the set of voter types who ﬁnd
Candidate i to be at least as good as his opponent. Let Ψi(ai,ˆ ai,κ) := {θ|uθ(ai,κ) ≥ uθ(ˆ ai,κ)} be
the set of voters who weakly prefer that candidate 1 implements policy ai rather than policy ˆ ai.
Deﬁnition 4 A society of voters is polarized if there exists a linear order “≤” of voter types such
that the following two conditions hold:
21If uncertainty is resolved only after the election, we can consider this as a model without uncertainty from the
candidates’ point of view. Certainly, individual preferences over policies must then take into account the likelihood
of diﬀerent states of the world. However, a pair of platforms chosen by the politicians translates deterministically
into vote shares.
22For example, introducing a small linearly-additive valence shock in Example 2 will not change the equilibrium
platforms chosen by the candidates.
161. Θi(a0,a1,κ) is an upper or lower interval (i.e., of the form {θ|θ ≤ θc} or {θ|θ ≥ θc}),23 or
empty, for all policies (a0,a1) ∈ A0 × A1 and all κ ∈ R2.
2. Ψi(ai,ˆ ai,κ), i = 0,1 is either empty or an upper or a lower interval for all policies ai ∈ Ai
and all κ ∈ R2.
For example, a scoring model with linear valence shocks satisﬁes Deﬁnition 4.
Remark 1 Suppose that citizens’ utility is of the form uθ(ai,κi) = v(θ,f(a))+κi and that
∂2v(θ,x)
∂θ∂x >
0. Then the society of voters is polarized.
We now show our main result in this section, namely that candidates choose majority-eﬃcient
platforms if the society is polarized and κ is a valence shock.
Theorem 5 Suppose that the society is polarized and that κ is a valence shock. Let Θ be endowed
with a topology such that uθ(a) is continuous in a and θ, and suppose there exist a unique median
voter. Then
1. Majority eﬃcient policies m0 and m1 exist.
2. (m0,m1) is an equilibrium.
5.2 Type and Preference Uncertainty
We now introduce two sources of uncertainty into our model, which are in fact formally equivalent:
First, we can allow for the possibility that voter preferences are uncertain; second while the pref-
erence ranking of each type may be known, the number of voters of each type could be random
random. A simple example of the latter case would be a Downsian model with uncertainty about
the position of the median voter. In this framework, we ﬁrst need to generalize our deﬁnition of
majority-eﬃciency to take into account that the majority-preference depends on the state of the
world.
Deﬁnition 5 Let ω ∈ Ω parameterize the model uncertainty and let µΩ be the distribution of ω.
Let  ω denote majority preference in state ω. Candidate j’s policy a∗ ∈ Aj is ex-ante majority-
eﬃcient if and only if µΩ({ω|a∗  ω a}) ≥ µΩ({ω|a  ω a∗}) for all a ∈ A.
Ex-ante majority-eﬃciency requires that there is no other of the candidate’s feasible policies
that is more likely to be preferred by a majority of agents. Our preferred way of thinking about
type uncertainty is as follows: Each voter actually knows his policy preferences and does not receive
a “shock” between platform choice and election; however, politicians are uncertain about how many
voters have which preferences. In this case, using a utilitarian approach based on some form of
“expected utility” would integrate over the diﬀerent incarnations of voters that the candidates
consider possible, but not aggregate utilities of actually existing voters. In contrast, our deﬁnition
just looks at which policy is more likely to be majority-eﬃcient.24
23The cutoﬀ θc can depend on the policies a and a
′ and on the realization of the shock κ.
24An alternative way of deﬁning eﬃciency with uncertainty would be to base the deﬁnition on the voters’ “expected
utility” (say, a policy is ex-ante majority-eﬃcient if there is no other policy that gives a majority a higher expected
utility). This deﬁnition would be reasonable if there is some ﬁxed set of voters with known preferences, and the state
of the world is some random event that inﬂuences preferences over policies and is realized after politicians commit to
their platform, but before the election. For uncertainty resolved after the election, see Footnote 21.
17Next, we introduce our normative concept of competition-eﬃciency. Rather than looking at
the behavior of one candidate (like majority-eﬃciency), competition-eﬃciency deals with the two
platforms proposed by the candidates. It asks whether a social planner could choose the two
platforms of the candidates in a way that makes a majority of the electorate better oﬀ than the
platforms chosen in equilibrium by the candidates. If the distribution of voter preference types is
known, competition-eﬃciency is very much related to majority-eﬃciency: If both candidates choose
majority-eﬃcient positions in equilibrium, then the pair of platforms is competition-eﬃcient.25
However, if there is uncertainty about the preference distribution, then the two concepts are not
necessarily related. The reason is that the social planner has two instruments (the two platforms)
for an optimal response to the uncertain preference distribution, and may ﬁnd it optimal to choose
platforms that are not ex-ante majority-eﬃcient so as to diversify the choices that are available for
the realized electorate. The concept of competition-eﬃciency therefore allows us, for example, to
analyze whether equilibrium candidate convergence is excessive.
We now deﬁne competition-eﬃciency formally. Suppose the two candidates propose policies a0





1 if a ≻ω a′;
0 if a′ ≻ω a;
0.5 otherwise.
(3)
Using function P, we can map each pair of policy platforms proposed by the candidates into the
policy implemented in equilibrium, and hence into utility allocations to voters.
Let Q(a0,a1,ˆ a0,ˆ a1,ω) denote the percentage of citizens who prefer the policy that results if
candidates choose platforms (a0,a1) rather than (ˆ a0,ˆ a1). Let µΘ|ω be the distribution over Θ in
state ω. Then,
Q(a0,a1,ˆ a0,ˆ a1,ω) = P(a0,a1,ω)P(ˆ a0,ˆ a1,ω)µΘ|ω
  
θ|uθ(a0,ω) ≥ uθ(ˆ a0,ω)
  
+ (1 − P(a0,a1,ω))P(ˆ a0,ˆ a1,ω)µΘ|ω
  
θ|uθ(a1,ω) ≥ uθ(ˆ a0,ω)
  
+ P(a0,a1,ω)(1 − P(ˆ a0,ˆ a1,ω))µΘ|ω
  
θ|uθ(a0,ω) ≥ uθ(ˆ a1,ω)
  
+ (1 − P(a0,a1,ω))(1 − P(ˆ a0,ˆ a1,ω))µΘ|ω
  




1. A pair of policies (a0,a1) is competition-eﬃcient in state ω if and only if
Q(a0,a1,ˆ a0,ˆ a1,ω) ≥ Q(ˆ a0,ˆ a1,a0,a1,ω)
for all (ˆ a0,ˆ a1) ∈ (A0,A1), i.e. a majority of citizens prefer the policy that is implemented
given platforms (a0,a1) to the policy implemented given any other pair of platforms, (ˆ a0,ˆ a1).
2. A pair of policies (a0,a1) is ex-ante competition-eﬃcient if and only if
µΩ({ω|Q(a0,a1,ˆ a0,ˆ a1,ω) ≥ Q(ˆ a0,ˆ a1,a0,a1,ω)})
≥ µΩ({ω|Q(ˆ a0,ˆ a1,a0,a1,ω) ≥ Q(a0,a1,ˆ a0,ˆ a1,ω)})
25To see why this must be true, suppose, to the contrary, that a social planner is able to improve upon a situation
in which both candidates choose a majority-eﬃcient platform and, say, Candidate 0 wins. If in the social planner’s
plan, the same Candidate 0 wins, then no improvement for a majority is feasible (as Candidate 0 has, by assumption,
a majority-eﬃcient platform). If Candidate 1 wins in the social planner’s plan and this makes a majority better oﬀ,
then the original situation cannot be an equilibrium, as Candidate 1 could have chosen this platform and have won.
18for all (ˆ a0,ˆ a1) ∈ (A0,A1), i.e. it is more likely than not that a majority of citizens prefer the
implemented policy given platforms (a0,a1) to the policy given any other pair of platforms,
(ˆ a0,ˆ a1).
Example 4 below demonstrates two points for weighted issue models with type uncertainty.
First, it is possible that both candidates wish to diﬀerentiate from each other and oﬀer divergent
policies on the same pledgeable issue. This result diﬀers from Example 3 where only one candidate
wants to diﬀerentiate while the other candidate would like to match his opponent’s action. As a
consequence, we have a pure strategy equilibrium with policy divergence in Example 4 whereas
the equilibrium in Example 3 involved mixed strategies. Second, the equilibrium need not be
competition-eﬃcient. It is interesting to note that, in this example, the social planner would
choose the same policy for the candidates, while, in equilibrium, they choose to diﬀerentiate. In
this sense, the equilibrium exhibits “excessive diﬀerentiation” by candidates. In contrast, as we
will see in Section 5.3, the equilibrium in a scoring model with type uncertainty generally exhibits
“excessive sameness”.
Example 4 There are three issues. Candidate 0 is ﬁxed to 0 while Candidate 1 is ﬁxed to 1 on
the ﬁrst two issues. On the third issue, candidates can choose any position. There are two states,
ω1, ω2, where ω1 occurs with probability p ∈ (0,1). There are three types of citizens:26
1. 40% are of type (0,0,0) and have utility functions −0.8|θ1 − a1| − 0.5|θ2 − a2| − 1.2|θ3 − a3|.
2. 20% are of type (1,0,0). In state ω1, utility is −0.8|θ1 − a1| − 0.5|θ2 − a2| − 0.2|θ3 − a3|. In
state ω2, utility is −0.5|θ1 − a1| − 0.8|θ2 − a2| − 1.2|θ3 − a3|.
3. 40% are of type (1,0,1) and have utility functions −0.8|θ1 − a1| − 0.5|θ2 − a2| − 1.2|θ3 − a3|.
We now determine how citizens rank the four feasible policy vectors (0,0,0), (0,0,1), (1,1,0) and
(1,1,1). First, note that type (0,0,0) always votes for Candidate 0 independently of the choice of
a3. The ranking of citizens of type (1,0,0) depends on the state: In state ω1 the ranking is (1,1,0) ≻
(1,1,1) ≻ (0,0,0) ≻ (0,0,1). In state ω2, the ranking is (0,0,0) ≻ (1,1,0) ≻ (0,0,1) ≻ (1,1,1).
Finally, citizens of type (1,0,1) rank policies as follows: (1,1,1) ≻ (0,0,1) ≻ (1,1,0) ≻ (0,0,0).
We now show that (0,0,0) and (1,1,1) is the unique Nash equilibrium. Given these strategies,
Candidate 0 wins in state ω2 and loses in state ω1. If Candidate 0 deviates to (0,0,1) then he
always loses. If, instead, Candidate 1 deviates to (1,1,0) then the candidate’s winning probability
does not change. However, (0,0,0), (1,1,0) is not an equilibrium, because, by choosing a3 = 1,
Candidate 0 can get the votes of type (1,0,1). These arguments also immediately imply that there
is no mixed strategy equilibrium.
Clearly, (1,1,0) is Candidate 1’s majority eﬃcient policy rather than the equilibrium policy
(1,1,1). We next show that (0,0,0), (1,1,0) is competition-eﬃcient in both states. Note that
(0,0,0), (1,1,0) dominate both (0,0,0), (1,1,1) and (0,0,1), (1,1,1), because the winner is the
same in both states, but with positive probability the majority preferred policy a3 = 0 is replaced
by a3 = 1. For the pair of platforms (0,0,1) and (1,1,0) Candidate 0 always wins. Again, in
state ω2, the identity of the winning candidate is the same and the majority prefers a3 = 0. In
state ω1, the outcome changes from (1,1,0) to (0,0,1), which makes both type (0,0,0) and (1,0,0)
worse oﬀ. Since (0,0,0),(1,1,1) is ex-ante competition-eﬃcient, it immediately follows that the
equilibrium is not competition-eﬃcient.
26For simplicity of presentation we focus on the only three types that matter. This example can be easily extended
to all 8 possible types (θ1,θ2,θ3), θi ∈ {0,1}.
19Finally, note that the example is robust with respect to small perturbations of preferences and
changes to the distribution of types. First, since preferences over policies are strict, any small
perturbation of preferences does not change the ranking over policies. Secondly, Example 4 goes
through for any distribution in which no type alone has a majority.
The intuition for Example 4 is that Candidate 0 has a very solid base of supporters (type
(0,0,0)), who vote for him independent of his policy on issue 3. In contrast, the base of support
for Candidate 1 is less solid. For example, type (1,0,1) is willing to switch to Candidate 0 if
Candidate 0 oﬀers a3 = 1 and Candidate 1 does not. This forces Candidate 1 to appease his base
by selecting a3 = 1. The “gamble” that Candidate 1 must take in order to win is that type (1,0,0)
does not care too much about issue 3, which is true with probability p.
There is some anecdotal evidence that “catering to the base” is sometimes a strategy that
increases a candidate’s winning probability. For example, in a memo written after the 2000 U.S.
presidential election, Bush campaign strategist Matthew Dowd recommends to abandon the focus
on swing voters, because there are only very few truly independent voters that could be won over
by adopting more moderate positions.27 While intuitive, such an argument is incompatible with
the standard Downsian model in which the median voter is decisive for the election outcome, no
matter how many voters “sit on the fence” (i.e., no matter how small the density of types is in the
neighborhood of the median). An argument based on the Downsian model is neatly summarized
in a comment by Suellentrop (2004), written two days before the 2004 elections: “The secret of
Bill Clinton’s campaigns and of George W. Bush’s election in 2000 was the much-maligned politics
of small diﬀerences: Find the smallest possible majority (well, of electoral votes, for both men)
that gets you to the White House. In political science, something called the median voter theorem
dictates that in a two-party system, both parties will rush to the center looking for that lone voter
– the median voter – who has 50.1 percent of the public to the right (or left) of him. Win that
person’s vote, and you’ve won the election.” In contrast, Suellentrop’s anticipated that Bush’s
political strategist Karl Rove made a fatal mistake in the 2004 election, “Bush’s campaign — and
his presidency — have appealed almost entirely to the base of the Republican Party. [...] Rove has
tried to use the Bush campaign to disprove the politics of the median voter. It was as big a gamble
as any of the big bets President Bush has placed over the past four years.” Assuming that Rove
and Bush indeed abandoned majority-eﬃcient policies in order to cater to the Republican base,
the election results have validated this strategy. As Example 4 shows, such a success is entirely
consistent with the equilibrium behavior in a weighted-issue model, but hard to rationalize in a
Downsian model.28
5.3 Type Uncertainty in the Scoring Model
Again, let ω ∈ Ω parameterize the uncertainty about the distribution of θ, and let µΩ be the
distribution of ω. Let θm(ω) be the median voter in state ω — we assume for simplicity that there
is a unique median voter.
The key determinant of equilibrium policies in the scoring model with uncertainty is the position
of the ex-ante median voter θm deﬁned such that the realized median voter θm(ω) ≥ θm with
27For a detailed account of the memo and its alleged implementation by the Bush administration, see Edsall (2006).
28In Downsian models with policy-motivated candidates, or in the citizen-candidate model, policy divergence occurs
in equilibrium. However, in these models divergence has a cost for candidates: If a candidate would (or could) move
closer to his opponent’s position, his winning probability would increase. Candidates are willing to sustain this cost of
divergence because they care about the policy that they can implement if elected. However, assuming that campaign
consultants are primarily motivated by winning (as their reputation and income depends on it), they should always
urge their clients to be more moderate.
20probability 0.5 and θm(ω) ≤ θm with probability 0.5, i.e., µΩ({ω|θm(ω) ≤ θm}) = µΩ({ω|θm(ω) ≥
θm}) = 0.5.
Theorem 6 Suppose that citizens’ utility is of the form uθ(a) = v(θ,f(a)), where f is real valued
and continuous. Let
∂2v(θ,x)
∂θ∂x > 0. Let θm denote the unique ex-ante median voter and let xm be the
most preferred policy score of θm, i.e., xm solves maxx∈R v(θ,x). Then
1. Policy aj∗ is ex-ante majority-eﬃcient if and only if aj∗ solves maxaj∈Aj uθm(aj).
2. If f(a0∗) = f(a1∗) then (a0∗,a1∗) is an equilibrium, and all pure strategy equilibria are ex-ante
majority eﬃcient.
3. If f(a0∗) < xm < f(a1∗) then (a0∗,a1∗) is an equilibrium.
Theorem 6 mirrors Theorem 3 in the characterization of majority-eﬃciency, however, the con-
ditions for existence of majority-eﬃcient equilibria are stronger in the case of type uncertainty.
The following example shows that there are robust cases in which only ex-ante majority-ineﬃcient
equilibria exist.
Example 5 Let f(a) =
 ∞
i=1 2−iai, and v(θ,x) = −(θ−x)2. Suppose that candidate 0 is ﬁxed to 0
on the ﬁrst two positions, while candidate 1 is ﬁxed to 1 on the ﬁrst position. Thus, candidate 0 can
obtain all policy scores in [0,1/4], while candidate 1 can obtain all policy scores in [1/2,1]. Suppose
that the median voter is distributed in [0,1] with a strictly positive density function, and that the
ex-ante median is at θm > 0.5. Then in equilibrium policy scores are 1/4 and 1/2, respectively.
Note that candidate 1’s ex-ante majority eﬃcient policy is xm = θm > 0.5. However, by moving
closer to candidate 0’s position, he can increase his probability of winning.
We now show that, if there is policy convergence, then in general there is too much convergence
from an eﬃciency perspective.
Theorem 7 Suppose that citizens’ utility is of the form uθ(a) = v(θ,f(a)), where f is real valued
and continuous. Let
∂2v(θ,x)
∂θ∂x > 0. Let θm denote the unique ex-ante median voter. Let xm be θm’s
most preferred policy score, i.e., xm ∈ argmaxx∈R v(θm,x). Suppose that xm ∈ f(A0)∩f(A1). Then
the equilibrium is competition-eﬃcient if and only if θm = θm(ω) a.e., (i.e., there is no uncertainty
about the median voter).
Intuitively, if one candidate oﬀered a policy that is most preferred by some voter θ′ with, for
example, θ′ < θm then eﬃciency of the electoral outcome is always strictly improved when the
realized median voter θm(ω) ≤ θ′. In other words, if the position of the median voter is not known,
then eﬃciency can be increased if candidates oﬀer diﬀerent platforms. However, for strategic
reasons, oﬀering diﬀering platforms is not in the interest of the candidates in a scoring model.
As Myerson (1993) points out, whether political competition induces too much convergence
is not obvious in the simple Downsian model: “Many authors seem to accept Hotelling’s view
that convergence of candidates is an undesirable outcome, because this ‘excessive sameness’ gives
voters no real choice. This view ignores some crucial diﬀerences between the economic and political
interpretations of Hotelling’s game. In the economic interpretation, when two shops are locating
on Main Street, minimization of the consumers’ total transportation cost requires separation of the
two shops. In the political interpretation, however, every voter’s utility is derived from the policy
position of the winning candidate (rather than the policy position of the one for whom he votes),
and so voters get no intrinsic utility from a diversity of options in the selection. Thus, candidate
21convergence in equilibrium does not necessarily cause any welfare loss.” For example, while voters
eﬀectively have no choice in a horizontal diﬀerentiation framework without uncertainty (because
both candidates oﬀer the median voter’s preferred policy), this equilibrium is still competition-
eﬃcient. However, when there is non-trivial uncertainty about the state of the world in the scoring
model, equilibria featuring complete candidate convergence are competition-ineﬃcient, because
some distance between candidates’ platforms would be valuable for a majority of voters.
6 Related Literature
We depart from most of the existing literature by using a binary description of the policy space.29
An advantage of the binary multidimensional model relative to the multidimensional Euclidean
model (Plott (1967), McKelvey (1976)) is that our model is relatively tractable, as the set of
preferences for which an equilibrium or a majority-eﬃcient position exists has positive measure,
and even if no pure strategy equilibrium exists, the mixed strategy equilibrium is straightforward
to compute.
Apart from tractability, we also believe that the binary description of policy is quite natural,
because most political campaigns are focused on relatively few clearly deﬁned issues, where the
politician can only be on record as being in favor or against the position. For example, in the 2006
US midterm elections, the key issues of “whether or not to impose a timetable for the withdrawal of
troops from Iraq”; “whether to support stem cell research”; or “whether to support a constitutional
ban on gay marriage”; all can be answered by yes or no. In contrast, the standard assumption of
a continuous policy space (say, the interval [0,1]), essentially implies that there are extremely
many, very ﬁnely distinguished diﬀerent positions to which candidates can commit. In reality, very
nuanced diﬀerences may be hard to communicate to voters (whose private incentives to understand
ﬁne diﬀerences between candidates’ platforms are small anyway, because the chance to be pivotal
for the election outcome is small for every voter in large electorates).
An alternative approach to ours of introducing multidimensionality of policies in a tractable
form is the probabilistic voting model (PVM; see Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Lindbeck and
Weibull (1993), Coughlin (1992)). The reason why candidates may choose non-median policies in
the PVM is that some voters may be more “movable” through a favorable policy and, in equilibrium,
candidates cater more strongly to the views of such swing voters. Such an eﬀect can also arise in
our model. More generally though, the range of possible eﬀects is larger in our model. For example,
we show that majority-ineﬃcient positions can also arise if all voters have the same issue weights
in their respective utility functions. Also, while both candidates converge to the same position in
the PVM, this need not be the case in our model: Candidates may ﬁnd it attractive to cater to
their hardcore supporters and hence choose substantially diﬀerent policies from their opponent (so
that very few voters are indiﬀerent between candidates). Furthermore, “ideological” preferences
enter only as random utility shocks to voters in the PVM, but are explicitly modeled as arising
from ﬁxed positions in our general model. We also show the crucial role of diﬀerent ﬁxed positions
for the result that candidates may choose diﬀerent positions in pledgeable issues.
With respect to the ability of candidates to commit to a policy, our model combines the Down-
sian model and the citizen-candidate model. In the literature on the standard one-dimensional
model pioneered by Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957),30 candidates are free to choose their po-
sition. In the citizen candidate literature pioneered by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley
29While such a framework has been used in contract theory (e.g., Krasa and Williams (2006)), our model is, to our
knowledge, the ﬁrst use of this approach in political economy.
30For a survey of this literature, see Osborne (1995).
22and Coate (1997), candidates are policy motivated and cannot commit to any other position than
their ideal one.31 Our model combines some dimensions on which candidates have no choice, ei-
ther because these dimensions capture some innate characteristics of candidates, or because their
preferences on some questions are well known and not credibly changeable, with other dimensions
in which candidates are free to choose a position.
A large literature exists that tries to explain, within the Downsian model, the empirical ob-
servation that candidates often propose considerably divergent policies. Candidates may diverge
even though this decreases their winning probability, because they care about the implemented pol-
icy and have non-median preferences (see, e.g., Wittman (1983), Calvert (1985), Roemer (1994),
Martinelli (2001), Gul and Pesendorfer (2006)). Other papers obtain policy divergence with oﬃce-
motivated candidates, but assume incomplete information among voters about candidates charac-
teristics (Callander (2003), Kartik and McAfee (2006)) or among candidates about the position of
the median voter (Castanheira (2003), Bernhardt, Duggan, and Squintani (2006)).32 In contrast
to all previous papers, policy divergence is possible in our weighted-issue model in a full informa-
tion environment, and, unlike in models with policy-motivated candidates, divergence increases a
candidate’s probability of winning.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a multidimensional binary model of political competition and
introduced the concepts of majority-eﬃciency and competition-eﬃciency. We believe that both the
binary model and the eﬃciency concepts, jointly or separately, will be useful for future research.33
The binary model, and in particular the weighted-issue model, provide an intuitive and tractable
framework for the analysis of multidimensional policy choice. For some dimensions, a candidate’s
position is ﬁxed, like in the citizen-candidate model, while for other issues, candidates can commit
to positions that maximize their electoral success probability, like in the Downsian model. The
combination of these two central models is both realistic and makes it possible to analyze questions
that cannot be adequately addressed in either the Downsian or the citizen candidate model. In
particular, we can analyze how diﬀerent ﬁxed positions inﬂuence the candidates’ position choice in
pledgeable issues. For example, in our model, a phenomenon like two candidates both “catering to
their respective base” (rather than converging on a common, “moderate”, position) arise naturally.
Also, our model shows that candidates may not only adopt minority positions if the minority cares
more intensely about an issue than the majority. This result contrasts sharply with the probabilistic
voting model.
To highlight the fact that our results are generated by multidimensionality of the policy space
and ﬁxed positions, we consider the framework with two oﬃce motivated candidates, which gener-
ates policy convergence in the Downsian setting. In contrast, in the weighted-issue model, equilib-
rium policies need not be majority-eﬃcient. This shows that two standard results of the Downsian
model — policy convergence of candidates, and movement of candidates “into the middle”, i.e.,
31While the citizen candidate model can, in principle, handle multiple policy dimensions, most papers in this
literature only look at a standard one-dimensional framework.
32A third branch of literature, which is less directly related to this paper, explains policy divergence as entry
deterrence by two dominant parties (e.g., Palfrey (1984), Callander (2005)), or in a framework where candidates have
costs of deviating from the national party platform (Eyster and Kittsteiner (2007)).
33In political economy models, majority-eﬃciency and competition-eﬃciency have the advantage of providing a
much tighter benchmark than Pareto-eﬃciency, while being based only on ordinal preferences and not requiring sum-
mation of the utilities of diﬀerent voters (such as utilitarianism). The notions of majority-eﬃciency and competition-
eﬃciency can clearly be applied in any political economy model, not just in the binary policy model.
23in a direction that is preferred by a majority of the electorate — are actually generated by the
one-dimensional structure of the Downsian model.
While we keep the assumptions of two, oﬃce-motivated candidates to facilitate a comparison
with the standard Downsian model, it is certainly interesting to analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent
assumptions (such as, e.g., policy-motivated candidates, more than two candidates, runoﬀ rule,
proportional representation) in the binary policy model. We leave these questions to future research.
8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that (a0,a1) is an equilibrium. Then, each candidate wins with
probability 0.5. (Suppose, to the contrary, that Candidate 0 (say), always loses. However, because
A0 = A1, he could improve by choosing ˜ a0 = a1, a contradiction). Let ˆ a be an arbitrary feasible
policy. If ˆ a ≻∗ a0, then Candidate 1 wins (with probability 1) if he oﬀers policy ˆ a. Since a0 is an
equilibrium strategy, a0  ∗ ˆ a for all ˆ a. Similarly, a1  ∗ ˆ a for all ˆ a. Hence, both a0 and a1 are
majority-eﬃcient.
Now suppose that a0 and a1 are majority-eﬃcient. We have to show that (a0,a1) is an equilib-
rium. Since a0  ∗ a1 and a1  ∗ a0 (by majority-eﬃciency), each candidate gets 50% of the votes
and thus wins with probability 0.5. Furthermore, by majority-eﬃciency of a0 and a1, a0  ∗ ˆ a and
a1  ∗ ˆ a, for all ˆ a. Hence, there is no proﬁtable deviation, so that (a0,a1) is an equilibrium.
Now consider a mixed strategy equilibrium (σ0,σ1). Each candidate must win with probability
0.5 (otherwise, the candidate who wins with the lower probability could deviate to the strategy of
his opponent, thereby increasing his winning probability to 0.5). Furthermore, in order for mixing
to be optimal, almost every policy in the support of σj must give agent j a winning probability of
0.5. Now, assume by way of contradiction that the support of σj contains a set B with µ(B) > 0,
such that no policy in B is majority-eﬃcient. Then policies in B only win if Candidate −j also
selects a non-majority-eﬃcient policy. Because the winning probability must be 0.5, this implies
that the opponent uses a non-majority-eﬃcient strategy with strictly positive probability. Let ˜ aj
be a majority-eﬃcient policy. Suppose that Candidate j uses the alternative strategy ˜ σj which uses
˜ aj whenever a policy in B is selected under σj and corresponds to σj, otherwise. Then ˜ aj wins
whenever the opponent selects a non-majority-eﬃcient policy and ties whenever the opponent uses a
majority-eﬃcient policy. Thus, Candidate j’s winning probability strictly increases, a contradiction.
Hence, almost every policy in the support of σj is majority-eﬃcient.
Proof of Theorem 2. Without loss of generality, let a∗ ∈ A0. First, suppose that a∗ / ∈ A1.
Then (ˆ a,a1), is an equilibrium for any a1 ∈ A1 (since a∗ ≻ a for all a ∈ A0 ∪A1, Candidate 0 wins
with probability 1, and Candidate 1 has no available policy that can beat or tie with a∗).
Now suppose that a∗ ∈ A1. Then (a∗,a∗) is the unique equilibrium: Since a∗ ≻ a for all
a ∈ A0 ∪ A1, any deviation leads to a loss. Furthermore, since a∗ wins against any other policy
with probability 1, no other strategy proﬁle can be an equilibrium.
The following lemma shows that, for any two policies a and a′, the set of voters who prefer a
to a′ is an upper or lower interval of the type space.
Lemma 1 Let
∂2v(θ,x)
∂θ∂x > 0. If v(˜ θ,f(a)) ≥ v(˜ θ,f(a′)), then either v(θ,f(a)) ≥ v(θ,f(a′)) for all
θ ≥ ˜ θ, or v(θ,f(a)) ≥ v(θ,f(a′)) for all θ ≤ ˜ θ.
24Proof of Lemma 1. Assume ﬁrst that f(a′) = x1 > f(a) = x0. By assumption, ∂
∂θv(θ,x) is









dt = v(θ,x1)−v(θ,x0)−[v(˜ θ,x1)−v(˜ θ,x0)], which
we can rearrange for











Hence, if the term in square brackets on the right-hand side is positive, then the left hand side is
positive for all θ > ˜ θ. If f(a′) = x1 < f(a) = x0, then a symmetric argument establishes that, if
v(˜ θ,x1) − v(˜ θ,x0) > 0, then v(θ,x1) − v(θ,x0) for all θ < ˜ θ.
Proof of Theorem 3. Lemma 1 immediately implies statement 1, because the set of voters
preferring any other policy to the median’s favorite policy must be an upper or lower interval not
containing the median, hence not a majority. The reverse implication in statement 1 is also obvious.
For statement 2, note that Lemma 1 implies that a candidate wins if and only if his policy is
preferred by type θm to his opponent’s policy. Hence, proposing aj∗ is clearly a weakly dominant
strategy for Candidate j, so that (a0∗,a1∗) is an equilibrium.
For statement 3, weak dominance of aj∗ implies that the election outcome must be the same in
any equilibrium. To prove that one candidate wins with probability 1 in any equilibrium involving
majority-ineﬃcient strategies, suppose (without loss of generality) that (a0,a1) is an equilibrium
and that a1 is not majority-eﬃcient. Suppose that, contrary to the claim, both candidates tie in
(a0,a1); then Candidate 1 could deviate to a1∗ and win with probability 1.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let Xi be deﬁned by
Xi(θ) =
 
1 if |θi − ai| = 0;
0 if |θi − ai| = 1.
Let a′ be an arbitrary alternative policy. Let D be the set of issues for which ai  = a′
i. Then policy











Let B = {0,1}. For each i ∈ N, let Yi: Θ×B → {0,1} be deﬁned by Yi(θ,b) = Xi(θ). We next
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Let Ti(θ,b) = θ for all i  = k. Then deﬁne T : Θ × B → Θ by T = (Ti)i∈N. Note that
Xi(T(θ,b)) ≥ Yi(θ,b), (6)
for all (θ,b) ∈ Θ × B and for all i ∈ N.
We now construct a probability measure ν on Θ × B such that
µ′(C) = ν(T−1(C)), and ν(C × B) = µ(C), (7)
25for all measurable subsets C of Θ.
Recall that a
j
k ∈ {0,1}. For all measurable sets C−k ⊂ Θ−k we deﬁne the marginal distribution
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fore (8) provides a well deﬁned probability. Now let ν({θk}×C−k×{b}) = µ({θk}×C−k)µ({b}|C−k)
for all measurable subsets C−k of Θ−k, for all θk ∈ {0,1} and for all b ∈ B. Then the deﬁnition of
ν extends to all measurable subsets of Θ × B.
Let ˆ a
j
k be the other element in {0,1}, i.e., ˆ a
j
k  = a
j
k. The deﬁnition of ν immediately implies that
ν(C × B) = µ(C). Next, note that T−1({a
j














































where the last equality follows from (8). Thus, (7) is satisﬁed.





























































Thus, the percentage of citizens who prefer aj to the alternative policy increases when we move

























Recall that a being preferred to a′ by citizen θ is equivalent to condition (5) being satisﬁed. Thus,
(9) and (10) imply
µ′
Θ−0({θ|uθ,θ0(a) ≥ uθ,θ0(a′)}) ≥ µΘ−0({θ|uθ,θ0(a) ≥ uθ,θ0(a′)})
≥ µΘ−0({θ|uθ,θ0(a′) ≥ uθ,θ0(a)}) ≥ µ′
Θ−0({θ|uθ,θ0(a′) ≥ uθ,θ0(a)}).
(11)
Integrating both sides of (11) with respect to θ0 implies that a is majority preferred to a′. Since a′
was arbitrary, this proves that a is majority-eﬃcient under µ′.
26Proof of Corollary 1. Let a′ be an arbitrary policy. Since,
 ∞
i=1 λi,θ0 < ∞ it follows that
(θ−0,a)  → uθ(a) is continuous in the product topology for ﬁxed θ0. Applying Theorem 4 inductively
proves that
µk
Θ−0({θ|uθ(a) ≥ uθ(a′)}) ≥ µk
Θ−0({θ|uθ(a′) ≥ uθ(a)}). (12)
for all k ∈ N. Because uθ(a) is continuous, it follows that {θ|uθ(a) ≥ uθ(a′)} and {θ|uθ(a′) ≥
uθ(a)} are closed sets. Taking the limit in (12) for k → ∞ yields µΘ−0({θ|uθ(a) ≥ uθ(a′)}) ≥
µΘ−0({θ|uθ(a′) ≥ uθ(a)}). Integrating over Θ0 implies that a is majority eﬃcient for µ.
Proof of Corollary 2. If |S| = 1, the result is immediate. Thus, without loss of generality, let
Sj = {1,2}, i.e., the ﬁrst two positions can be chosen freely. Let a = µ({(0,0)} × {0,1}N), b =
µ({(1,0)}×{0,1}N), c = µ({(0,1)}×{0,1}N), and d = µ({(1,1)}×{0,1}N). Clearly, a+b+c+d = 1.
Further, without loss of generality, let assume that c + d ≥ a + b and b + d ≥ a + c. This
immediately implies that d ≥ a. Now consider a distribution ˜ µ with a = ˜ µ({(0,0)} × {0,1}N) =
˜ µ({(1,1)} × {0,1}N), and 0.5 − a = ˜ µ({(0,1)} × {0,1}N) = ˜ µ({(1,0)} × {0,1}N). Because of
symmetry of ˜ µ, any policy is majority eﬃcient, for example a policy with a1 = a2 = 1. In order
to get distribution µ from ˜ µ we must move weight from {(0,1)} × {0,1}N and {(1,0)} × {0,1}N
to {(1,1)} × {0,1}N. This is possible as long as 0.5 − a ≥ c and 0.5 − a ≥ b. Suppose by way of
contradiction that 0.5−a < c. Then a+c > 0.5. Because a+b+c+d = 1 this implies a+c > b+d,
a contradiction. Similarly, 0.5 − a < b contradicts c + d ≥ a + b.
Proof of Corollary 3. See text.
Proof of Remark 1. Consider the natural linear ordering of Θ (given by the standard “≥”).
Without loss of generality suppose that xi = f(ai) > f(a−i) = x−i. Thus, for θ1 > θ0, we have





















because the assumption that
∂2v(θ,x)







> 0 for all θ. Thus,
if citizen θ0 ∈ Θi(a0,a1,κ) (i.e., [uθ0(ai,κi) − uθ0(a−i,κ−i)] > 0 in the ﬁrst line), then, for the
inequality to hold, it must be true that uθ1(ai,κi) − uθ1(a−i,κ−i) > 0 so that θ1 ∈ Θi(a0,a1,κ).
An analogous proof shows that Ψ0 and Ψ1 are upper or lower intervals, or empty.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let mi ∈ argmaxai∈Ai uθm(ai,κi). Note that a maximum exists because
utility is continuous in ai and Ai is compact, and, by Deﬁnition 3, the maximum is independent of κi.
We show that mi is majority eﬃcient. For all ai ∈ Ai, uθm(mi,κi) ≥ uθm(ai,κi). By condition 2 of
Deﬁnition 4, Ψi(mi,ai,κi) is either empty or an upper and lower interval. Since θm ∈ Ψi(mi,ai,κi)
it follows that Ψi(mi,ai,κi) is an interval containing θm. Thus, µ(Ψi(mi,ai,κi)) ≥ 0.5, so that mi
is majority eﬃcient.
Next, suppose that ˜ ai / ∈ argmaxai∈Ai uθ(ai,κi), so that uθm(mi,κi) > uθm(˜ ai,κi). Thus, con-
tinuity of utility with respect to θ implies that there exists a neighborhood Uθm of θm such that
Uθm ⊂ Ψ(mi,˜ ai,κi). Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 4 implies that Ψ(mi,˜ ai,κi) is an upper or lower
27interval. Because this interval contains an open set containing θm (the unique median) it follows
that µ(Ψ(mi,˜ ai,κi)) > 0.5, i.e., ˜ ai is not majority eﬃcient.
It remains to prove that (m0,m1) is an equilibrium. Let a0 ∈ A0 be an arbitrary alternative
policy that is not majority eﬃcient. Then Candidate 0 wins if
µ({θ|uθ(a0,κ0) ≥ uθ(m1,κ1)}) > µ({θ|uθ(m1,κ1) ≥ uθ(a0,κ0)}), (13)
and ties if the equality holds in (13). By condition 1 of Deﬁnition 4, there exists θp ∈ Θ such that
{θ|uθ(a0,κ0) ≥ uθ(m1,κ1)} is either an upper interval {θ|θ ≥ θp} or a lower interval {θ|θ ≤ θp}.
Without loss of generality, suppose that the latter is the case. Then (13) implies that θm < θp. Since
a0 is not majority eﬃcient it follows that uθm(m0,κ0) > uθm(a0,κ0) ≥ uθm(m1,κ1). Thus, there
exists an open neighborhood Uθm of θm with Uθm ⊂ Θ0(m0,m1,κ). By condition 1 of Deﬁnition 4,
Θ0(m0,m1,κ) is an upper or lower interval containing θm, and thus µ(Θ0(m0,m1,κ)) > 0.5, i.e.,
Candidate 0 wins also with m0. If a0 ties, i.e., the equality holds in (13), then candidate 0 wins with
m0. Since this argument applies for any κ, the winning probability does not increase if Candidate 0
deviates to a0. An analogous argument applies for Candidate 1, so that (m0,m1) is an equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 6.
Proof of Statement 1. Suppose that aj∗ solves maxaj∈Aj uθm(aj). If f(aj)  = f(aj∗) then θm is
strictly better oﬀ with aj. By continuity of v, there exists a neighborhood of θm such that all
citizens θ in the neighborhood are strictly better oﬀ with aj∗. Lemma 1 implies that the set of
all citizens θ who prefer aj∗ to another policy aj ∈ Aj is an upper or lower interval. Since this
interval contains a neighborhood of θm and θm is the unique ex-ante median voter, it follows that
µΩ({ω|uθ(ω)(aj∗) > uθ(ω)(aj)}) > 0.5, i.e., aj∗ is ex-ante majority eﬃcient. Conversely, if aj∗ is ex-
ante majority eﬃcient, then uθm(aj∗) ≥ uθm(aj) for all aj ∈ Aj. Otherwise, if uθm(aj∗) < uθm(aj) a
majority of citizens would prefer aj to aj∗ in a majority of states. Thus, aj∗ solves maxaj∈Aj uθm(aj).
Proof of Statement 2. If candidates choose (a0∗,a1∗) then each candidate wins with 50% prob-
ability. Without loss of generality suppose that candidate 0 deviates to a0. Statement 1 implies
that θm strictly prefers a1∗ to a0. Thus, repeating the argument from above, candidate 0 now wins
with a probability of strictly less than 50%. Hence the deviation is not optimal. Conversely, if
candidate 0 chooses a strategy a0 that is not ex-ante majority eﬃcient, then candidate 1 wins with
probability strictly greater than 50% by selecting a∗1 and hence also by selecting the best response
to a0. Instead, candidate 0’s winning probability is at least 50% if he chooses a0∗.
Proof of Statement 3. Without loss of generality suppose that candidate 0 deviates to a0. Lemma 1
implies that the set of citizens θ that prefer a0 to a1∗ is an interval. However, since a0∗ solves
maxˆ a0∈A0 uθm(ˆ a0) and f(a0∗) < xm, this interval is strictly smaller than the interval of citizens that
prefer a0∗ to a1∗.
Proof of Theorem 7. Theorem 6 implies that in equilibrium f(aj) = xm for j = 0,1. Suppose
that θm(ω) < θm with positive probability. Let ˆ x be marginally smaller than xm, and consider the
alternative pair of platforms (xm, ˆ x). Then, in states with θm(ω) < θm, a majority of voters prefers
ˆ x, while in states with θm(ω) ≥ θm, the outcome remains the same. Hence, the equilibrium is not
competition eﬃcient.
Conversely, suppose that θm(ω) = θm for a.e. ω, but that the equilibrium (a0,a1) is not
competition-eﬃcient. Let ˆ aj ∈ Aj, j = 0,1 be arbitrary. If f(ˆ a1) = f(ˆ a2) then citizens are
28indiﬀerent between the two policies. Furthermore, if xm  = f(ˆ aj) then a majority of citizens in state
ω prefer (a1,a2) to (ˆ a1,ˆ a2), i.e.,
Q(a1,a2,ˆ a1,ˆ a2,ω) ≥ Q(ˆ a1,ˆ a2,a1,a2,ω). (14)
If f(ˆ a1)  = f(ˆ a2) then Candidate j wins if uθm(ω)(ˆ aj) ≥ uθm(ω)(ˆ a−j). Without loss of generality
suppose that f(ˆ aj) > xm. Then there exists ˜ θ > θm such that all agents θ < ˜ θ strictly prefer aj.
Since, θm(ω) = θm, for a.e. ω, this means that a majority of citizens prefers aj to ˆ aj, i.e., (14)
holds. Thus, (a1,a2) is competition-eﬃcient.
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